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Research Article
Who Marries Whom?
Educational Homogamy in Norway
Gunn Elisabeth Birkelund 1
Johan Heldal 2
Abstract
A number of previous studies have documented a fairly high level of marital homogamy
in Norway. Most of these studies, however, have been local and ethnographic, or based
on national data measuring homogamy within a limited time period.
This study is based on a sample of 129 651 individuals from the 1980 Census.
From this data bank, a sample of couples is constructed. Patterns of educational
homogamy across five ten-year cohorts, born between 1900 and 1949, are compared.
The results show a decline in educational homogamy across these cohorts, both in
absolute terms and when controlling for the general increase in educational level during
the period.
                                                          
1
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1. Introduction
Marital homogamy usually refers to marriage between partners of the same social group.
Homogamy based on group affiliation may be – and indeed has been – defined in
various ways; either by social background, by ethnic group, by religious group, by
regional, demographic or social dispersion, by educational attainment, by status group
or present social class. A high level of homogamy indicates few intimate and profound
relations between members of different social groups. On the other hand, high rates of
intermarriage are expected to reduce the ability of the family to pass on to its offspring
group specific values and worldviews. Thus, intermarriage can be assumed to be a
cause, as well as an indicator, of social and cultural openness and integration
(McDowell 1971; Blau, Blum and Schwartz 1982; Labov and Jacobs 1986; Pagnini and
Morgan 1990; Hout and Goldstein 1994; Botev 1994; Kalmijn 1991b, 1998; Smits,
Ultee and Lammers 1998). (See note 1).
In this paper we will explore some elements of these features, focusing on educat-
ional homogamy in Norway, covering five cohorts, born between 1900 and 1949.
Couples with similar level of education are defined as homogamous, whereas couples
with different levels of education are not. (See note 2).  The task we will investigate
here is whether there in Norway are any trends across these cohorts in educational
homogamy, and if so, what patterns can be detected.
The study is in two parts. In the first part, the propensity to homogamy is studied
for married men and women separately. In the second part, a joint measure of
homogamy is proposed, applied to couples. The data are considered differently in the
two parts and selection biases affect the two parts differently, and this will be discussed.
The study is conditional, given that marriage has taken place. The propensity to marry,
which is an important part of the entire picture, has not been studied because of serious
selection effects associated with such a study.
2. Earlier research
Previous Norwegian studies document a high level of homogamy, yet none of them
explore trends over time in marriage patterns in Norway (Sundt [1866] 1992; Øyen
1964; Rogoff Ramsøy 1966; Dyrvik 1970; Birkelund 1987; Kravdal and Noack 1989;
Blom, Noack and Østby 1993; Hansen 1995; Birkelund and Goodman 1997; Skrede
1999). (See note 3).  Studies from other countries give a fairly differentiated picture of
trends in homogamy over time: In some countries there has been an increase in
homogamy, such as the USA (Mare 1991, Kalmijn 1991a) and Germany (Blossfeld and
Timm 1997, referred in Kalmijn 1998). Other countries, however, show stability over
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time, and a Swedish study (see Henz and Jonsson 2000) shows a decline in educational
homogamy over time. (See note 4).
Cross-national analyses have also shown a mixed pattern. In a study of 64
countries, (see note 5), educational homogamy is related to the level of economic
development: “As the level of development increases, educational homogamy increases,
subsequently peaks, and then decreases” (Smits, Ultee and Lammers 1998:281). In other
words, this study found a non-linear relationship between the two variables ‘educational
homogamy’ and ‘economic development’. The study is based on a number (albeit large)
of countries at different levels of ‘economic development’, not longitudinal data, which
naturally limits the conclusions with regard to processes over time.
A common feature of most previous studies of marriage patterns has been their
descriptive character, documenting patterns of homogamy within specific time and
space constraints. As argued by Kalmijn (1998), there is less emphasis on the
mechanisms that generate these patterns of marriage. Let us briefly consider theoretical
arguments about marriage selection.
3. Theoretical arguments
Finding a partner for marriage is certainly related to “love” and sexual attraction. But
attraction and “love” does not operate arbitrary; rather, marital selection is presumably
related to seeking a partner with assets and qualifications, which are similar to one’s
own. Martial selection can therefore be understood in the same way as job selection,
where individuals search for a partner in a marriage market rather than a job in a labour
market (England and Farkas 1986).
At the individual level, two factors are important. First, marital selection is related
to the preferences of individuals. Individuals are seen as agents who try to maximise (or
satisfy) their future family income and social status by searching for what they regard as
the most attractive partner. Since preferences reflect social and cultural values, the
notion of attractiveness is expected to vary - not only among members of different social
groups, but also over time. People with similar cultural backgrounds can be expected to
share a “common universe of discourse” (DiMaggio and Mohr 1985) and are therefore
likely to confirm each other’s behaviour and worldviews (Kalmijn 1994). (See note 6).
Second, marital selection is related to and constrained by the opportunity structure,
the marriage market. The structure of the marriage market influences the chances of
individuals to realise their preferences. Marriage markets can be defined in terms of the
overall demographic composition of the population as a whole, or in a more local
fashion, such as educational institutions, workplaces, etc. (England and Farkas 1986;
Mare 1991; Blossfeld, Timm and Dasko 1998, Dagsvik 2000). (See note 7). The
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marriage market consists of the population at risk of being chosen for marriage.
Competition in the marriage market determines who gets whom. In a marriage market in
equilibrium we would therefore expect that “The outcome of this competition is that the
most attractive candidates select among themselves while the least attractive candidates
have to rely on another” (Kalmijn 1998:398).  At the societal level, competition for the
most attractive partner (as measured by socio-economic resources) would lead to an
aggregate pattern of homogamy. (See note 8).
In his study of the USA, Mare found evidence of increased homogamy between the
1930s and the 1970s, which might be the result of “increasing competition in the
marriage market for wives with good prospects in the labour market” (Mare 1991:15).
This increase was, however, followed later by a decline in homogamy. (See note 9).
This decline might be related to changes in the composition of the marriage market; for
instance, a changing willingness to marry (increasing cohabitation) (Qian 1998), and/or
a decreasing competition for women with good education, due to a greater supply of
highly educated women in the younger cohorts.
Theoretical considerations and previous empirical research on the modernisation of
the Norwegian society leads us to summarise our expectations:
1. It seems fair to argue that Norway at the beginning of the 20th century was
characterized by a gendered societal division of labour, where men’s main
responsibility was to be their family’s breadwinner, and women’s main
responsibility was to take care of the household and children.
2. A majority of the first birth cohorts in the 20th century would have no education
above compulsory schooling. We would therefore expect a high level of
educational homogamy in these cohorts; i.e. a majority of the married couples
would consist of men and women with similar (the lowest) level of education.
3. Processes of modernisation implied, however, an increased demand for workers
with education above compulsory schooling. Since boys were expected to be the
breadwinners, more boys than girls were given opportunities by their parents for
education beyond the level of compulsory schooling.
4. Thus, educational attainment increased more among men, than among women. The
educational differences between men and women would lead us to expect a decline
in educational homogamy over time; i.e. we would expect the older cohorts to be
more homogamous than the younger cohorts.
5. Processes of further modernisation eventually implied new patterns of gender roles
after WWII, leading more girls to take higher education as well. For cohorts born
after WWII, we would therefore expect an increase in the association between the
spouse’s educational levels, in particular at higher levels of education.
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4. Data and variables
In order to explore our topic thoroughly we would need individual level data covering
the marriage histories of individuals. This would require that actual marriages were
related to the population at risk of marrying, men and women, at every point in time
(Qian and Preston 1993). Then we would be able to analyse simultaneously whether
people get married or not, who gets married, and to whom. We would also be able to
explore first marriage, and – if divorce – whether people remarried, and if so, to whom
(Blossfeld and 	


data. Rather, we will rely on a 10 percent sample of individuals from the 1980 census.
For each person in this sample we have information about their marital status and level
of education at the time of the census, and if married or once married, the same
information on the spouse. Individuals who had never been married were excluded from
the sample, as were individuals with missing information on their own educational level,
or their partner’s educational level. This made a sample of 129 651 men and women. In
part one of the study, where men and women are analysed separately, this sample is
considered as two sub-samples of individuals, one for each gender. Individuals are
classified into cohorts by their own birth year. In part two, the sample is considered as
one sample of couples. The couples are classified into cohorts according to the average
age of the spouses. Further details are given below.
4.1 Selection problems
There are selection problems related to our data that should be acknowledged. First, we
might have a selection problem related to divorce. Kalmijn (1991a) pointed out that
stability of inhomogamous couples is lower than stability of homogamous couples; thus,
the degree of homogamy within cohorts will increase by time causing bias. However, we
know that the oldest cohorts in our sample have low divorce rates. Statistics Norway
documents that the cumulated divorce rates in 1980 are less than 10 percent for
Norwegians who married between the 1920s, when the 1900-09 cohort was young, and
the 1950s. (See note 10).  People who married between 1955 and 1970 had the highest
propensity of divorce, ranging from 11 to 14 percent. After 1970 divorce rates declined
again. (See note 11).  Men and women born in the 1930’s and the 1940’s are likely to
have married between 1955 and 1970. Following Kalmijn, we might expect a selection
favouring homogamous couples in these cohorts.
Second, and related to this, we may confound first and later marriages. For
individuals who have been divorced or widowed and remarried we will not have
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information on their first marriage. We will thus not be able to explore, for instance, if
couples that marry for the second time are more homogamous than first marriages.
Third, and without going into detail, due to relations between marital status,
gender, education and mortality, the selection of survivors to 1980 will be biased
samples of the original cohorts, in particular for the oldest ones. This can be expected to
affect the unigender analysis in part one more than the analysis in part two, since
univariate distributions for each gender in the first analysis can be biased without
necessarily affecting log-linear association structures among variables or between
genders seriously (the second analysis). However, selection bias can affect the analysis
in part two if the propensity to homogamy was different for couples where no one
survived until 1980 than for couples where at least one survived.
Fourth, we do not have information on cohabitation. This might affect the youngest
cohorts in particular. The first so-called cohabiting cohort was born around 1950: Thirty
percent of all Norwegians born between 1948 and 1952 started their first partnership as
cohabitants; a figure that rose to 55 percent of those born between 1953 and 1957 (NOU
1999:262, Table 3.5). Thus, married couples within our 1950-59 cohort, which would
be 21-30 years in 1980, would be a highly selected group. We will therefore not include
this cohort in our analyses.
Finally, we have a problem related to duplicates. Approximately 10 percent of the
women and 10 percent of the men in the original sample whose spouses were still alive
will also have their spouse in the sample, thus generating duplicate couples. Among
them, five percent of the sampled couples have another five percent as their duplicates.
(See note 12).  Since the proportion of couples where both are alive in 1980 is smaller
in the older cohorts, these cohorts are less affected by the duplication. This duplication,
which has taken place randomly but generates an overrepresentation of couples with two
survivors, has not been accounted for in the analysis. (See note 13).
4.2 Variables
We have constructed a cohort variable, with five 10-year cohorts: The oldest cohort
consists of individuals born between 1900 and 1909, and the youngest cohort comprises
individuals born between 1940 and 1949. For women, each cohort is classified
according to the women’s year of birth. We do not include information about their
husbands’ age/cohort. Similarly, for men, each cohort is classified according to the
men’s year of birth. We do not include information about their wives’ age/cohort.  In
part two of the analysis, where the units under study are couples, the ten year age cohort
for each couple is based on the average year of birth for wife and husband. As
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mentioned above, the 1950-59 cohort will not be included in any part of our analyses.
(See note 14).
Educational level is measured by the Norwegian Standard Classification of
Education 1973 (Statistics Norway 1973), with a few modifications. (See note 15,
Børke 1984:131 and Vassenden 1987:48):
Level 1: compulsory education (years 1-9, not including pre-school education)
(grunnskole).
Level 2: secondary level I (10 years) (realskole/framhaldsskole/yrkesskole, etc.).
Level 3: secondary level II (11-12 years) (gymnas/vidergående skole).
Level 4: college/university level I (13-14 years).
Level 5: college/university level II (15-16 years).
Level 6: high university level  (17 years or more).
For the spouses we only include the first five levels of education.
Marital status is a dichotomy, where individuals who are married at the time of the
census, or who have been married before, are classified as married. Thus, those who are
not and never have been married are classified as unmarried and excluded from our
sample.
Let us now proceed by first addressing the educational attainment of men and
women within each cohort.
5. Part I. Patterns of educational homogamy
Figure 1 shows the distribution of average educational attainment of each cohort, by
sex. We see an increase in the average level of education from the oldest to the youngest
cohorts, reflecting an overall rise in educational attainment. This development is well
known in many countries (Shavit and Blossfeld 1993). We note that the gender gap in
education is fairly stable across cohorts, except for the1950-59 cohort (i.e. individuals
who were in their twenties in 1980), where women have gained in on men in terms of
educational attainment.
Figure 2 shows educational homogamy by cohort, separately for men and women.
Two categories of marriages have been distinguished: In homogamous marriages the
spouses have the same level of education, in heterogamous marriages this is not the
case. The heterogamous marriages may be characterised as ’marrying down’ or
’marrying up’ – depending upon one’s point of view. A women with low education who
has married a man with a higher education has ’married up’, whereas her husband has
’married down’. This example is a fairly common pattern, reflecting different
educational attainment of men and women.
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Figure 1: Educational level by cohort and gender
In the oldest cohort, approximately 70 percent of all marriages were homogamous,
in the youngest cohort approximately 40 percent. In the oldest cohort, nearly all
homogamous marriages consisted of couples where both partners had compulsory
schooling as their highest educational level (see Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix). We
also see that for both men and women, there is an increasing percentage across cohorts
who ’marries up’ – more often amongst women than men. There is also an increasing
percentage across cohorts who ’marries down’ – more often amongst men than women.
Thus, for Norwegians born in the first half of the 20th century, who married at least
once and survived to 1980, we find a decline across cohorts in the propensity to
educational homogamy along with a general increase in educational attainment. One
may question whether the observed trend is due to the changes in educational level
alone or if there exists a component of the trend that cannot be attributed to these
changes.
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Figure 2: Educational homogamy
Homogamy by Birth Cohorts. Men. Percent.
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6. Part II. A marginal free measure of homogamy
A generalised odds-ratio, called H, is constructed to measure the degree of homogamy.
This special measure is constructed in such a way that it is unaffected by purely
marginal changes in the distribution of men and women’s educational level and is only
sensitive to changes in the internal association structures in the 5 x 5 cross tabulations of
both spouses’ level of education. A value of H larger than one indicates a general
propensity to homogamy while a value less than one indicates the opposite. Changes in
H across cohorts therefore constitute changes in propensity to homogamy that are not
due to changes in the distribution of level of education in the marginals of the 5 x 5
tables. The measure H can be expressed and analysed in terms of the parameters of a
log-linear model and can also be seen as a generalisation of the log-linear parameter that
was used in Smits, Ultee and Lammers (1998) to describe the degree of educational
homogamy in and across countries. When Smits et al study variation in educational
homogamy across 65 countries with varying degree of technological and economical
development, each at one point in time, we study educational homogamy across cohorts
in one country. The main difference in the analysis is that the effect of the class variable
“country”, which is a purely nominal variable, has been replaced by “cohort”, which is
ordinal, and therefore sets the direction for a possible trend. As a generalised odds-ratio,
H and can be described by a set of contrasts for log linear parameters.
6.1 The homogamy measure H. The general case
Consider a II ×  table for two categorical variables X and Y, which in our application
are her and his educational level in a randomly selected married couple. X and Y take
values , 1, , 5x y I= = . The expected cell frequencies are xyF . Consider the
measure
1 /
1
1 / ( 1 )
1
( )
( )
I
I
ii
i
I
I I
x y
x y
F
H
F
=
−
≠ =
=
∏
∏
(1)
The nominator in (1) is the product of the expected cell frequencies for the diagonal
cells and the denominator is the similar product for the off-diagonal cells.  If X and Y are
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independent, 1H = .  A tendency to concentration on the diagonal makes 1H > .  It is
easily seen that H is not affected by multiplication of some row or column by a constant
and therefore not affected by purely marginal changes of the table.  Formulating the log
expected cell frequencies in log-linear terms, that is
log X Y XYxy x y xyF λ λ λ λ= + + + ,
log H is seen to be a contrast in the two-way parameters XYxyλ  ’s only:
1 1
1 1log ( 1)
I I
XY XY
ii xy
i x y
H
I I I
λ λ
= ≠ =
= −
−
∑ ∑ .
In log H each of the I diagonal cells have been given a weight 1/I while each of the I(I-
1)off-diagonal cells have been given a weight -1/I(I-1).  So the weights sum to zero
across row and across each column and thus across all cells in the table.  This is
essential for making log H dependent of the XYxyλ  ’s only and independent of the row
and column marginals.
Studying the variation of H or log H over time or cohorts is equivalent to studying
this quantity in each layer of a three-way table xycF  where the c dimension represents
the cohort variable C. The log-linear representation of such a three-way table is
log XC YCX Y C XY XYCxyc x y c xy xc yc xycF λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ= + + + + + + + .
An interpretation of the third order parameters XYCxycλ  is as the effect of cohort
category c on the log-odds ratio for the husband’s and the wife’s education levels. (See
note 16).  In log-linear terms the log H for cohort c can be expressed as
1 1
1 1log ( ) ( )( 1)
I I
XY XYC XY XYC
c ii iic xy xyc
i x y
H
I I I
λ λ λ λ
= ≠ =
= + − +
−
∑ ∑
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1, ,c C=  .  The difference for one cohort to the next can be formulated as
1 , 1 , 1
1 1
1 1log log ( ) ( )( 1)
I I
XYC XYC XYC XYC
c c iic ii c xyc xy c
i x y
H H
I I I
λ λ λ λ
− − −
= ≠ =
− = − − −
−
∑ ∑    (2)
The hypothesis of no change in the over all propensity of homogamy, that is the
hypothesis
0 0 1: CHyp H H H= = =
can be expressed as the hypothesis that the C contrasts in the log ’scH are zero:
0log log 0, 1, ,cH H c C− = =  ,
or equivalently
0
1 1
1 1( ) ( ) 0,( 1)
I I
XYC XYC XYC XYC
iic ii xyc xyc
i x yI I I
λ λ λ λ
= ≠ =
− − − =
−
∑ ∑
1, ,c C=  .  This clearly only depends on the third-order effects.  Particularly, if the
homogeneity model indicating constant odds-ratios across layers hold, (all 0XYCxycλ = ),
the hypothesis 0H will also hold.
Six log-linear models were run. Table 1 tells how these models fit the data. In
estimations with a large number of observations parameters may be deemed statistically
significant from zero by the classical chi-square tests even when their deviations from
zero are completely unsubstantial. An attempt to account for this is the BIC measure,
calculated by 2 logG df n− ⋅ , where n is the number of observations in the table, here
128928.  The BIC criterion for choosing a model implies choosing the model with the
lowest BIC.
By classical testing criteria, only model III, which defines a linear trend in the
association between husbands and wives’ education, fits the data. The BIC criterion
prefers model VI, saying that this linear trend is symmetric in men and women's
education level.
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Table 1: Seven models for the association between husband and wife’s education
across cohorts.
Model Description 2G df BIC
I Saturated model 0 0 0
II Model I, but XYC XYCxyc yxcλ λ= 54.54 24 -227.86
III Model I, but XYCxyc xy cλ β= ⋅ 54.04 48 -510,78
IV Model III, but yx xyβ β= 91.85 54 -543.57
V Model IV, but also XY XYyx xyλ λ= 341.76 60 -364.26
VI 0XYCxycλ = , Homogeneity model 845.11 64 92.02
6.2 Model I, the saturated model
Table 2 shows the estimates ˆ , 0, ,4cH c =   for the five cohorts and log of the ratio of
cH  to 0H , which measures the change compared to the reference cohort 1900-1909.
The estimates, which are based on the fits from a saturated model, indicate a decline in
H over cohorts.
Table 2: Estimates of the homogamy measure H  for five cohorts based on the
saturated model (model I), relative change and 95% confidence bounds
for the relative change.
Cohort c
cH 0/cH H Lower bound Upper bound
1900-09 0 3.081 1
1910-19 1 3.079 0.9994 0.8139 1.2272
1920-29 2 2.762 0.8964 0.7377 1.0892
1930-39 3 2.732 0.8867 0.7316 1.0747
1940-49 4 2.631 0.8539 0.7068 1.0317
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6.3 Model II
Model 3 and 4 by Smits et al (1998) was essentially similar to our model II except that
XYZ
xycλ was given further structure of the form
( , )XYZxyc cS x yλ γ= ,
where ( , )S x y  was taken to be | |x y α−  (symmetric) and α was taken as 1 and 1.5 in
the two models. In particular, ( , ) 0S x x = . In their model c represented country, not
cohort, and it could therefore not define a trend. Model II says that the inhomogeneity
of the odds ratios between X and Y (with the homogamity cells x = y as references)
across cohorts increases symmetrically with difference in education level between the
two spouses. This symmetric structure is the same for all cohorts but its size is
modulated for the different cohorts with the parameter 
cγ .  However, this model does
not fit our data. (See note 17).
6.4 Model III and IV
Model III says that for each combination of husbands and wives’ education level, there
is a linear trend over cohorts in the log-odds ratios for each specific combination of
husband’s and wife’s education level. The log-linear formulation of the model is
, 0,1,2,3,4XYCxyc xyc cλ β= = .
In our data this model has 48 degrees of freedom.
The estimates of the trend parameters are given in table 3.  Model III therefore
implies a linear trend in the generalised log odds for homogamy,
0 1 0log log log( / )cH H c H H= + , or 0 1 0( / )ccH H H H= . The estimate of
1 0log ( / )H H  is completely determined by the estimates in table 3 and is computed as
the average of the betas on the diagonal minus the average of the betas off the diagonal
(see appendix). The resulting estimates are 0ˆlog 1 .117H =  and
1 0
ˆ ˆlog( / ) 0 .0379H H = − .
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Table 3: Trends
xyβ .  X = her education level, Y = his educational level. Model III.
X\Y 1 2 3 4 5
1 -0.2321 0.0043 0.0845 0.0716 0
2 0.2034 0.1306 0.1850 0.1497 0
3 0.0884 0.1491 0.1700 0.1486 0
4 -0.1061 -0.1039 -0.0468 -0.0511 0
5 0 0 0 0 0
The number 0.1850 in cell (2,3) in Table 3 can be interpreted by saying that the
odds that a man with education level 3 finds a spouse with education level 2 rather than
one with education level 5 (reference category) compared to the same odds for a man
with education level 5, has, in average, been increasing with the factor 0.1850 1.203e =
each decade through the first five decades of the twentieth century. The numbers in the
other cells can be interpreted similarly. This estimate is significantly different from zero
with a p-value of 0.0006. It should be noted that none of the negative numbers in row 4
of table 3 are individually significantly different from zero. The dominating contribution
to this result is the reduction in propensity of men and women in the lowest educational
category to find a spouse in the same category expressed by the negative number -
0.2321 in cell (1,1). Table 4 is the equivalent of table 2 for model III.
Table 4: Estimates of the homogamy measure H  for five cohorts based on model
III, relative change and 95% confidence bounds for the relative change.
Cohort k kH 0/kH H Lower bound Upper bound
1900-09 0 3.056 1
1910-19 1 2.943 0.9628 0.9422 0.9838
1920-29 2 2.833 0.9270 0.8877 0.9679
1930-39 3 2.728 0.8925 0.8364 0.9523
1940-49 4 2.626 0.8592 0.7881 0.9369
The corresponding change in the generalised log odds-ratio per decade is
1
1 1
1 1log log 0.0379, 1, ,( 1)
I I
c c ii xy
i x y
H H k K
I I I
β β
−
= ≠ =
− = − = − =
−
∑ ∑ 
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Model IV is similar to model III except that the symmetry of the beta matrix is
claimed: 
xy yxβ β= . This can be called a symmetric trend model. The model provides
the estimates 0ˆlog 1.112H =  and 1 0ˆ ˆlog( / ) 0.0362H H = − . The estimates for the beta
matrix are given in Table 5.
Table 5: Trends
xyβ .  X = her education level, Y = his educ. level. Model IV
X\Y 1 2 3 4 5
1 -0.2473 0.1615 0.1144 -0.0550 0
2 0.1615 0.2676 0.2352 0.0330 0
3 0.1144 0.2352 0.2043 0.0200 0
4 -0.0550 0.0330 -0.0200 -0.1512 0
5 0 0 0 0 0
For each cohort the propensity to marry homogamously has declined. Thus, our
hypothesis about a decline in educational homogamy is empirically supported, also after
we have controlled for the increasing education attainment across these cohorts.
One could think of a modification of the measure H to weight the off diagonal cells
differently with weights 0 1 2 1I Iv v v v− −≥ ≥ ≥ ≥   (with at least one strict inequality)
depending of how far the cell is from the diagonal.  Such a measure would present a
more detailed model of homogamy, yet it would not be completely independent of the
marginals in the two-way table. Since our main purpose has been to validate our finding
about decreasing homogamy across these cohorts considered, we will not consider other
models of association here.
7. Summary
Both in absolute and relative terms there has been a decline in educational homogamy in
Norway for cohorts born between 1900 and 1949. As we expected, educational
homogamy is strongest in the oldest cohorts, reflecting the fact that very few people
born at the beginning of the 20th century had more than compulsory schooling. As
Norway industrialized, the propensity to marry homogamously gradually declined,
reflecting the wider dispersion of education within the cohorts born in the 1920s, 1930s
and 1940s. In particular, amongst the heterogamous marriages, men were more likely to
marry ‘downwards’ than opposite, reflecting men’s likelihood of having equal or higher
educational attainment than women. This trend complies with anticipations from
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theoretical considerations pointing at the separation of breadwinning and care taking
work in the families due to the industrialisation of the society and the increasing
demands for education of men (as breadwinners) compared to women (as caretakers).
Our results show that this decline in educational homogamy is sustained even after we
control for the overall increase in educational attainment across these cohorts.
We have focused on cohorts born in the first half of the 20th century. The changes
that took place within the cohorts born in the 1950s and later have not been investigated
in this article. It might be the case that as more women undertake higher education,
more men with high education will find a spouse at a similar educational level, resulting
in an increase in high-level educational homogamy. This question will be addressed
later with data from the Census 2001.
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Notes
1.  Studies of marital homogamy, and its counterpart intermarriage, also give insight
into social inequality and differentiation. Since income and other resources are
related to the household, marital homogamy could imply larger inequalities between
households than between individuals.
2.  Given that many women, in particular in the oldest cohorts, have not been gainfully
employed, education is a more convenient measure of homogamy than for instance
occupationally based class or stratification schemes.
3.  Homogamy is defined in different ways in these studies, e.g. social class, regional
affiliation, education. For an overview of Norwegian family sociology, see Eriksen
and Wetlesen 1996.
4.  A common feature in the (Western) societies analysed “has been a decline in the
importance of social background for marriage choice”, indicating that in younger
cohorts, parents have less control over their children’s choices, as well as the
increasing importance of new marriage markets, such as the schools and
universities (Kalmijn 1998:411).
5.  Including a Norwegian survey from 1972.
6.  This is the case, not only for individuals from different social origins, but also for
gender: The traditional gender division of labour implies gender specific roles: A
male provider and a female caretaker. Based on these family values, for women, an
attractive man will be expected to be a good family provider, whereas for men, an
attractive woman will be expected to be a good mother and housewife. Partner's
educational attainment will therefore be more important for women than for men.
More modern values, not based on a traditional gender role system, would imply, at
least partly, different sets of preferences. Today, women take longer education and
also participate in the labour market. Thus, educational attainment is important to
women as well as men. When women take more part in the labour market, their
human capital is more important, also for the men who marry them. In a similar
vein: When men take more part in care work at home, their potential as a good
father is also of importance for the women who marry them. Therefore, women
would be expected to prefer men who could both be a good provider and a good
father. (See Wærness 1987; Thagaard 1997; Ellingsæter 1998; Crompton 1999).
Value systems, such as modern gender values, are also differentiated across social
groups, such as generations and social classes.
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7.  Institutions of higher education are important both as marriage markets and as
institutions that might affect the students’ preferences. Workplaces are important,
for the same reasons, etc.
8.  This argument does, however, ignore the possibility of market constraints, such as
shortages of a particular type of potential partners. Oppenheimer (1988) have
argued that women might search for a longer time period after a marital partner if
there are shortages of men with attractive qualifications. This can imply, for
instance, that women with high education delay or drop marriage. If this were the
case, we would not expect an aggregate pattern of homogamy, at least not at the
highest levels of education (i.e. women with high education would be less likely to
marry). However, in a situation of shortage of potential ‘suitable’ partners, women
might choose another strategy: They might expand their ‘pool’ of potential partners
by lowering their preferences, i.e.: “cast a wider net”. If this were the case, we
would expect a higher ratio of heterogamous marriages.  Lichter et al. (1995:412)
did not, however, find support of this thesis; rather, they found that “market
conditions – good or bad – have little to do with women’s willingness to marry
heterogamous”. Their research thus indicate that the supply of potential mates (i.e.
the population at risk) does not have any bearing on the patterns of associative
mating: “we found little evidence that mate surpluses or deficits in the local
marriage market affect patterns of homogamy or associative mating.” (Lichter et al.,
1995:412). Thus, whereas the market situation (population at risk) seems to have a
bearing on women’s willingness to marry  (Qian and Preston 1993, Lichter et al.
1995, Lewis and Oppenheimer 2000), it appears to be less vital for studies of
marital homogamy.
9.  Mare (1991) has also shown that the timing of the transition out of school and into
marriage is important. See also Chan and Brendan (2000).
10.  Of all couples that married in 1920, 5,82 percent were divorced in 1980; of all
couples that married in 1926, 7.02 percent were divorced in 1980, etc. up to 9,99
percent of all couples that married in 1954 (T. Noack, Statistics Norway).
11.  These cumulated divorce rates are calculated on the basis of the actual marriage
cohorts within each year independent of other reasons for marriage break-up, such
as death.
12.  The sample was a 10 percent sample of individuals from the census with spouses or
former spouses linked. Among them N men and the same number of women had
(former) spouses still alive at the time of the 1980 census. Each person is sampled
with probability p = 0,1. Considering the sampling as a sampling of couples we can
for each of the N couples have four possible outcomes:
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1. "Neither of the spouses is drawn." This has probability (1-p)² =  0.81
2. "Husband is drawn but not the wife" has probability p(1-p) = 0.09 giving rise
to 0.09N couples in the sample.
3. "Wife is drawn but not the husband" has probability p(1-p) = 0.09 giving rise
to 0.09N couples in the sample.
4. "Both are drawn" has probability p² = 0.01 giving rise to 0.01N couples
represented twice in the sample.
Thus, among the N couples 0.09N + 0,09N + 2·0.01N = 0.20N couples are
represented in the sample, of whom 0.01N, or 5 percent, have copies.
13.  The average age difference between the spouses included in these analyses differs
to a certain extent. The oldest cohort (1900-1909) has on average 2 years age
difference between the spouses, whereas spouses in the next cohort (1910-1919)
differ with 0.8 years. The other cohorts reveal an age difference between the
spouses close to 0. We do therefore, not regard this selection as a large problem for
the interpretation of our finding, yet, caution is advisable.
14.  57 percent of the men and 36 percent of the women in this cohort were unmarried.
This is to be expected, since this cohort was 21-30 years at the time of the 1980
census, and many individuals in this cohort have not yet had time to marry.
15.  The changes are related to old types of education (undertaken before 1973) which
was not classified in 1973; education that was classified with other types of
education in 1973, but later given a separate code; education that did not exist in
1973, but did so in 1980, and finally, education undertaken abroad. (Vassenden
1987:48).
16.  The s’λ are not uniquely defined unless further specifications are given. This
however, does not affect the measure H. In the analyses of model I, III and IV the
specifications used are 0=XYCxycλ  when 5=x  or 5=y  or 0=c  which are
reference categories for the three variables involved. This gives XYCxycλ  the
interpretation as the difference (or inhomogeneity) in the log-odds ratio of
education level (x, y) versus (5,5) for cohort c versus cohort 0. In the analysis of
model II it has been more convenient to choose the diagonal cells where x=y as
references.
17.  A trend model of this kind would be the same as taking model IV with
| |xy yx x y αβ β γ= = − .        Set    1 1( , ) / ( 1) | | / ( 1)I Ix y x yS S x y I I x y I Iα≠ = ≠ == − = − −∑ ∑ ,
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the average of ( , )S x y  over all off-diagonal cells. Then by (2),
1 1log log ( )c c c cH H Sγ γ− −− = − , meaning that in the particular models of Smits et
al. variations in log cH and variations in cγ  across cohorts or countries are
equivalent expressions of the same variations. Though, 
cH  is more generally
defined and applies to a larger class of models.
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Table A1: Cross tabulation of husband and wife’s educational level by cohort.
Percent. Men.
                 Wife’s education
Cohorts
Husband’s
education Compuls. Second. I Second. II Col./uni.I Col./uni.II
1900-09 Compulsory 67,4 3,0 1,0 0,3
Secondary I  8,6 2,4 0,6 0,3
Secondary II  5,3 2,1 0,8 0,3
Coll./univ. I  1,6 0,6 0,4 0,3 0
Coll./uni. II  0,4 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,1
Higher univ.  1,0 1,4 1,0 0,4 0,3
Total 5381
84,2
618
9,7
264
3,9
111
1,7
31
0,5
1910-19 Compulsory 64,9 3,8 1,4 0,3
Secondary I  8,4 2,0 0,8 0,3 0,1
Secondary II  6,4 1,8 1,2 0,4 0,1
Coll./univ. I 1,6 0,7 0,7 0,4 0,1
Coll./uni. II  0,3 0,3 0,2 0,2 0,1
Higher univ. 0,6 0,8 1,0 0,5 0,5
Total 10569
82,2
1228
9,6
678
5,3
263
2,0
119
0,9
1920-29 Compulsory 53,1 5,5 1,4 0,5 0,1
Secondary I 9,4 2,7 1,1 0,5 0,1
Secondary II 7,4 2,9 1,7 0,7 0,2
Coll./univ. I 2,4 1,8 1,1 0,8 0,3
Coll./uni. II 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,3
Higher univ. 0,8 1,0 1,1 0,9 0,7
Total  11349
73,5
2203
14,3
1043
6,8
579
3,7
275
1,8
1930-39 Compulsory 40,6 7,7 1,5 0,8 0,2
Secondary I 9,7 4,2 1,3 0,7 0,2
Secondary II 8,8 4,1 2,0 1,0 0,2
Coll./univ. I 2,9 2,2 1,3 1,3 0,5
Coll./uni. II 0,5 0,7 0,5 0,8 0,6
Higher univ. 0,7 1,0 1,1 1,7 1,4
Total 8619
63,3
2695
19,8
1035
7,6
841
6,2
426
3,1
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Table A1: Continued
                 Wife’s education
Cohorts
Husband’s
education Compuls. Second. I Second. II Col./uni.I Col./uni.II
1940-49 Compulsory 26,3 9,6 2,2 0,9 0,3
Secondary I 9,3 5,5 1,8 1,1 0,2
Secondary II 7,8 5,5 2,6 1,5 0,5
Coll./univ. I 3,0 3,3 1,9 2,3 0,8
Coll./uni. II 0,7 1,1 0,8 1,4 1,3
Higher univ. 0,6 1,2 1,5 2,7 2,2
Total 8972
47,8
4895
26,1
2031
10,8
1856
9,9
997
5,3
1950-59 Compulsory 15,8 12,6 3,2 1,1 0,2
Secondary I 6,6 10,0 3,6 1,4 0,3
Secondary II 5,7 9,9 5,4 3,1 0,4
Coll./univ. I 1,4 2,9 2,3 3,6 0,8
Coll./uni. II 0,3 0,7 0,9 1,7 1,5
Higher univ. 0,3 0,5 0,8 1,7 1,3
Total 3434
30,0
4189
36,6
1868
16,3
1454
12,7
512
4,5
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Table A2: Cross tabulation of wife and husband’s educational level by cohort. 
Percent. Women.
                  Husband’s education
Cohorts
Wife’s
education Compuls. Second. I Second. II Col./uni.I Col./uni.II
1900-09 Compulsory 68,6 7,9 5,5 1,5 1,2
Secondary I 3,5 2,5 1,7 0,8 1,2
Secondary II 1,0 0,4 0,5 0,3 1,4
Coll./univ. I 0,4 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,6
Coll./uni. II 0,1 0,1
Higher univ. 0,1
Total 3296
73,5
496
11,1
351
7,8
133
3,0
207
4,6
1910-19 Compulsory 65,8 9,1 6,8 1,5 1,1
Secondary I 3,0 2,1 1,8 0,8 1,2
Secondary II 1,1 0,8 0,9 0,4 1,0
Coll./univ. I 0,3 0,2 0,3 0,3 0,6
Coll./uni. II 0,1 0,2
Higher univ. 0,1 0,3
Total 7699
70,4
1344
12,3
1084
9,9
335
3,1
480
4,4
1920-29 Compulsory 56,7 9,3 7,4 2,4 1,1
Secondary I 4,6 2,5 2,6 1,3 1,4
Secondary II 1,4 1,1 1,5 0,9 1,6
Coll./univ. I 0,5 0,3 0,5 0,6 1,1
Coll./uni. II 0,1 0,1 0,2 0,3
Higher univ. 0,3
Total 9405
63,3
1987
13,4
1799
12,1
799
5,4
879
5,9
1930-39 Compulsory 43,8 9,5 8,8 2,9 1,4
Secondary I 6,8 3,7 3,7 1,9 1,8
Secondary II 1,8 1,3 1,7 1,2 1,8
Coll./univ. I 0,5 0,6 0,8 1,3 2,1
Coll./uni. II 0,2 0,1 0,3 0,3 1,0
Higher univ. 0,7
Total 7274
53,1
2094
15,3
2098
15,3
1052
7,7
1189
8,7
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Table A2: Continued.
                  Husband’s education
Cohorts
Wife’s
education Compuls. Second. I Second. II Col./uni.I Col./uni.II
1940-49 Compulsory 29,9 9,7 8,1 3,1 1,3
Secondary I 8,5 5,3 5,0 2,9 2,3
Secondary II 2,0 1,9 2,5 1,7 2,1
Coll./univ. I 1,0 1,0 1,2 1,9 3,8
Coll./uni. II 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 2,3
Higher univ. 0,1 0,1 1,0
Total 7712
41,5
3375
18,2
3212
17,3
1906
10,3
2385
12,8
1950-59 Compulsory 19,1 7,5 5,9 1,8 0,7
Secondary I 12,4 8,9 8,1 3,0 1,6
Secondary II 3,0 2,9 4,6 2,2 1,6
Coll./univ. I 1,3 1,4 2,7 3,3 3,7
Coll./uni. II 0,2 0,3 0,5 0,6 2,0
Higher univ. 0,1 0,1 0,5
Total 5456
36,0
3184
21,0
3324
21,9
1677
11,1
1529
10,1
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